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Conference Papers 1 of 3
Session Type Parallel Session
Date Day One: November 8, 2006
Long Description Our ambition here is to complete standard policies of institutional design aiming at reducing ethnic grievance in fragile states locked in a conflict-poverty trap, by policies focussing on the "demand side" of the democratic framework. We are more precisely interested in citizens’ civic sense since it appears more likely to durably anchor concord among citizens than exogenously designed institutions.
In this setting, the paper investigates whether, in an ethnically divided democracy like Ethiopia, crucial ethical concerns like aversion towards inter-ethnic inequity may have a significant negative impact on citizens’ decision to vote for their ethnic party rather than for a nationwide party, and whether this impact may ride roughshod over selfish interest.
Built on a questionnaire that we conducted in May 2004 among 331 students from Addis Ababa University, our analysis is organized in three steps. In a first section, we explain the reasons for concentrating on Ethiopian politics, besides the fact that Ethiopia is currently one of the most fragile states in the world. In a second section, we propose a way of modelling citizens’ trade-off between their selfish and their ethical concerns in this Ethiopian context, by adapting Fehr and Schmidt’s utility function with inequity aversion (1999). In a third step, we test our theoretical predictions by relying on a logit analysis. Our findings yield reasons both for despair and for delight.
Attached File Participation_Valfort.pdf
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